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1 Introduction
The increasing amount of credit default events together with the recent economic
development as well as the Basel II project have shown that credit risk is not only
the oldest but also the most significant kind of risk in banking business. Prior to
the introduction of credit derivatives banks had mainly to rely on a buy–and–hold
strategy and were only able to influence the structure of their portfolio by selecting
and monitoring borrowers. Further, the selection of borrowers and thus diversifi-
cation was more or less restricted due to a restricted scope of accessible borrowers
and industry branches. This situation changed considerably with the introduction
of credit securitization and credit derivatives. Both instruments put banks and cor-
porations in a position to move from a mere buy–and–hold strategy to the active
management of credit risk. The importance and impact of this recent development
is emphasized by the exponential growth of trading volume of credit derivatives and
the increasing use of securitization. Among credit derivatives credit default swaps,
by far, possess the highest market share and liquidity. According to the Credit
Derivatives Report 2002 of the British Bankers Association (British Bankers’ As-
sociation (2002)), credit default swaps made up almost half of the market, while
securitization carried a market share of 22%, leaving each of the remaining instru-
ments with a portion of no more than 8%. Partly, this can be attributed to the
increasing use of synthetic securitization in which a credit default swap is used to
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transfer credit risk to a special purpose vehicle instead of the underlying pool of debt
itself (cf. Watzinger (2000)). A credit default swap is a bilateral financial contract
usually based on a ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) master
agreement that standardizes contractual details. The protection seller grants an
insurance payment in case of default and the protection buyer pays a periodic fee
in return. Under certain conditions (cf. O’Kane and McAdie (May 2001)), this fee
equals the spread between the yield of the underlying and the risk free interest rate.
It is distinguished between the typical physical settlement which is the delivery of
the defaulted debt to the protection seller for the face value and cash settlement
where the protection seller compensates the loss given default. As the difference
between face value and recoverable value of a physical delivery coincides with the
loss given default, we are able to model both types of settlement in the same way.
The ongoing globalization process and the tremendous growth of markets for
credit derivatives since the mid 1990’s have substantially increased the interdepen-
dencies of banking business. Due to this development banks should not only try to
just optimize their credit portfolio with respect to measures like credit–value–at–
risk (CVaR) and risk adjusted performance measures (RAPM) but also take into
account a possible strategic impact of their business decisions on interest rates and
hedging on the behavior of competitors. As regards market risk, the literature al-
ready suggests a motive to use derivative instruments not only for hedging but also
for strategic reasons – see for example Allaz and Vila (1993) and Hughes and Kao
(1997).1 Hence, it is reasonable expecting credit derivatives to be used as strategic
devices in the competition of banks too. In this context a business decision of bank
A is said to have a strategic effect or impact, respectively, when it can be consid-
ered as a ”strategic move” in the sense of Schelling (1960) who defined a strategic
move as one that influences the choice of the competitor by affecting his expecta-
tions about how A will behave in future in a way that is beneficial for A. Schelling
outlines four features that characterize a strategic move. Firstly, such a move is
sequential, that is to say, A is able to move before the competitor makes his or her
final move. Secondly, the move has to be known to the competitor before he moves.
Thirdly, A’s move must affect incentives of A so that it changes the future optimal
behavior of A. Moreover, the move must affect what the competitor considers as the
optimal behavior of A and it must influence the competitors behavior accordingly.
This fourth feature is termed rational expectations. The strategic move is successful
if it increases the profit of bank A.
Our paper will figure out situations in which these requirements are met and
in this way presents a formal argument of when credit derivatives may be consid-
1In an oligopolistic setting of producing firms of the Cournot type Allaz and Vila (1993) show
that even without a hedging motive firms may use forward markets to threaten harder competition
with competitors. However, their key assumption is observability of the futures positions. Hughes
and Kao (1997) prove that risk averse duopolists use forwards even without such an observability.
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ered to be strategic devices in the competition of banks. That is, in view of the
impressing evolution in the use of credit derivatives as a means to separate credit
risk form market risk and to enable its active trading, our analysis provides first
insights into the strategic role of credit derivatives in the context of an oligopolistic
banking industry where banks face credit risk, and a market for credit derivatives,
more precisely credit default swaps, exists. Furthermore we analyze how the timing
of the decision process influences the strategic impact of an active portfolio man-
agement with credit derivatives. Banking practice suggests three kinds of decision
processes. Assume any arbitrary fixed volume H to be tradable at the market for
all available underlying, and notice, a bank’s risk aversion is reflected in its (un-
hedged) net position in loans. Then the first possibility is production to influence
hedging, because a bank is very likely to lower interest rates in order to obtain a
substantial and lucrative credit volume that fits into its portfolio, given the bank
is able to hedge the new credit at the market. As this will substantially increase
the unhedged loan volume the bank needs to increase hedging activities in order to
keep the net position in loans constant that reflects its risk aversion. The second
possible order of the decision process is when hedging influences production – i.e.
the managements decision on interest rates for loans and deposits. Under beneficial
market conditions a bank may be inclined to higher its hedging volume or even to
speculate increasingly via going long the credit derivatives market, that is to say,
buying protection. In order to keep the net position constant, the loan volume will
be increased via lower loan interest rates. These two possible scenarios in banking
practice made us not only to investigate a possible strategic effect of hedging on
production but also the other way round. Additionally, we take into account a third
scenario in which the decision on hedging and the level of interest rates for loans
and deposits is made simultaneously – even though it does obviously not meet the
qualitative characteristics set out by Schelling (1960) and is less relevant in practice.
The plan of the paper is as follows: section 2 establishes the model. Section 3
successively investigates the strategic effects of hedging. Firstly within simultaneous
decisions (section 3.1), then within an decision on interest rates that precedes the
hedging decision(section 3.2), and finally in section 3.3 the other way round. For
the first two cases we will not find any strategic effects, neither of hedging nor
of production. In contrast, when the hedging decision precedes the decision on
interest rates for loans and deposits we find an increasing hedge volume to higher
the demanded interest rate for loans. Section 4 concludes and the appendix covers
the formal proofs of the stated propositions.
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2 A Model of Competing Banks
The model applied for the following analysis is based on suggestions by (Yanelle,
1985, p. 5) and (Yanelle, 1988, p. 4ff.) who argues that in the banking industry
competition via prices – that is interest rates for deposits and loans – is much more
likely than competition using volumes of deposits and loans. This is obvious since
overall deposits and loans may be considered homogeneous and hence lenders care
for a high commission for making funds available for financing investment projects
and borrowers are interested in loans at low cost. Thus, competition in the banking
industry takes place by simultaneously deciding on interest rates in the deposit and
loan market.
In particular consider a one period setting with two identical banking firms (say
A and B) which simultaneously decide on deposit and loan rates. We assume that
banks behave non-cooperatively in the decision making process. Since both banks
may have market power in the deposit market as well as in the loan market deposit
supply and loan demand depend on the level of deposit and loan rates, respectively.
Furthermore, the volume of deposits taken and the volume of loans issued by a
particular bank is influenced by the competitor’s behavior. That is, the effective
deposit supply (Dˆi) and the effective loan demand (Lˆi) function for any bank i =
A,B may be written as follows:
Dˆi(rDi , rDj) =

0, rDi < rDj ;
1
2
D(rDi), rDi = rDj ;
D(rDi), rDi > rDj ;
i, j = A,B; i 6= j (1)
and
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) =

0, rLi > rLj ;
1
2
L(rLi), rLi = rLj ;
L(rLi), rLi < rLj
i, j = A,B; i 6= j. (2)
The interpretation of these functions is obvious. If one considers the effective
deposit supply function at first it should be noted that the effective deposit sup-
ply depends on both his own and the deposit rate of the competitor, i.e. Dˆi =
Dˆi(rDi , rDj) ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j. The distinction of the cases regarding the re-
lations between deposit rates states in which way actual volumes of deposits are
determined contingent on the actual interest rate in the deposit market. That is, we
assume that there is a unique deposit supply function in the market denoted D(rD)
which is allocated among both banks depending on their deposit rate. In case of
different deposit rates among banks the one with the higher interest rate serves the
entire market while the one with the lower rate is not getting offered any deposits.
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However, if deposit rates are the same, both banks will share the market equally.
In this context the deposit supply function is assumed to to be twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and concave, i.e.
dD(rD)
drD
> 0 and
d2D(rD)
(drD)2
< 0.
Furthermore let D(0) > 0, because even with a zero deposit rate customers are
inclined to hold a certain level of deposits for transactional reasons.2 As a result
the effective deposit supply is differentiable in sections, increasing and concave.
Moreover, the deposit supply of one bank increases with its own and decreases with
the competitor’s deposit rate:
∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDi
≥ 0 and ∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
(∂rDj)
≤ 0.
The interpretation of the effective loan demand function follows analogously if
one considers L(rL) as the unique loan demand function in the market. Hence,
the effective loan demand states how to allocate loan demand at the current loan
rates among both banks. In this context loan demand L(rL) is assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing and concave:
dL(rLi)
drLi
< 0 and
d2L(rLi)
(drLi)
2
< 0.
Moreover, since worldwide available funds are bounded, it is reasonable to assume
that L(0) <∞. Thus the effective loan demand function is differentiable in sections,
decreasing and concave. Further a bank’s loan demand decreases with its own loan
rate and increases with the competitor’s loan rate:
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
≤ 0 and ∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLj
≥ 0.
Further assume taking deposits and issuing loans to cause no operating costs. Of
course, this assumption seems not very reasonable since in reality operating costs
play some role. One might also argue that these costs arise to an extend that is
relevant for banks’ decision making. However, abstracting from operating costs is
much less restrictive than it might appear at a first glance. While an introduction
of constant operating costs would sophisticate notation there were no additional or
different insight from such a model. In addition we neglect any reserve requirements
to be met by the banks. This is feasible since consideration of any certain share α of
deposits to be held with the central bank at zero interest just complicates notation
but again does not affect our results.
2In Germany so called Giro accounts can serve as an example.
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An important assumption which distinguishes our model from other settings of
the literature is the existence of an interbank market where both banks are able to
lend or borrow any desired amount of funds at an exogenously given and riskless
interest rate r.3 This assumption is important since the interbank market separates
the banks’ decisions on deposit and loan rates.4 In this regard let Mi ; i = A,B
denote bank i’s difference between loan and deposit volume that is borrowed from
or lent to the interbank market at an interest rate of r. Thus bank i’s balance sheet
constraint may be written as
Mi + Lˆi(rLi , rLj) = Dˆi(rDi , rDj) +K ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j (3)
where K denotes an exogenously given certain amount of equity capital which is the
same for both banks.
Both banks are assumed to face the same credit risk, modelled by the random
variable θ˜ = δ˜ · λ˜ ∈ [0, 1].5 Thus credit risk can be split up into the default event
δ˜ ∈ {0, 1} and loss given default (LGD) λ˜ = (θ˜ | δ˜ = 1) ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, if δ˜ = 1 a
bank i looses the share λ˜ of the end–of–period payment (1+ rLi)Li from its debtors.
The symmetry of credit risk in our framework appears due to the fact that θ˜ and
the respective distribution function F (θ˜) are the same for both banks. This latter
assumption seems reasonable since one might argue that in reality competing banks
often focus major parts of their loan business on the same geographical regions –
no matter whether we deal with locally or globally playing banks. And in this way,
generally speaking, they lend to the same kind of borrowers and are thus exposed
to the same kind of credit risk.
However, both banks can hedge credit risk by entering a market for credit default
swaps (CDS).6 These derivative financial instruments pay in the case of borrower
default (i.e. δ˜ = 1) at the end of the period a random amount of λ˜ ·H to the seller of
protection, where H is the face value. Due to the definition of the credit risk θ˜ this is
equivalent to CDS paying the stochastic amount θ˜ ·H. In return the seller of credit
risk pays a deterministic premium θ¯ ·H to the buyer of credit risk. Additionally, we
assume an unbiased market in which E(θ˜) = θ¯ holds. The market for CDS is also
3To motivate the assumptions with respect to r consider this interest rate to be determined by
the central bank.
4Yanelle (1985) and Yanelle (1988) do not consider an interbank market. Accordingly, the
volumes of loans lent and deposits taken must be equivalent. At the end, this restriction is crucial
for the main result of these papers by which there does not appear the Bertrand Paradox in the
price competition of symmetric banks. However, we will show in the following that this assumption
is not necessary to derive similar results.
5During the paper all random variables will be denoted by a ”˜ ”.
6Credit default swaps are the most widely used kind of credit derivative (see e.g. Broll et al.,
2003, p. 5) which is the reason why we focus the analysis on these instruments.
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assumed to provide a perfect hedge, i.e. there is no basis risk left.7
If one denotes by Hi the volumes of CDS sold by bank i = A,B it is obvious that
buying proctection with a CDS grants the bank a stochastic claim θ˜Hi in exchange
for the deterministic insurance premium θ¯Hi. The stochastic claim is paid in case of
default, that is at the end of our 1-period setting. On the other hand the premium
is paid at the settlement date in practice. To circumvent the need to discount the
premium we decided to let the premium paid at the end of the period too. With the
further assumption that Hi is not restricted in any way it is obvious that hedging
contributes (θ˜ − θ¯)Hi to bank i’s profit. As a result bank i’s profit may be written
as
Π˜i =
(
(1− θ˜)rLi − r
)
Lˆi(rLi , rLj)− θ˜Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + (θ˜ − θ¯)Hi +
+(r − rDi) Dˆi(rDi , rDj) + rK. (4)
In (4) the balance sheet constraint (3) has been already considered.
Both banks are considered to behave risk averse with identical von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function U(·) having U ′(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) < 0.8 Thus, bank
i maximizes its expected utility of profit with respect to deposit rates, loan rates
and the hedging volume. In this regard it is assumed that decisions on deposit and
loan rates are made simultaneously at the beginning of the period. That is, when
making decisions a bank takes optimal deposit and loan rates of the competitor as
given and maximizes the own expected utility in order to achieve a best response
on this behavior. When doing so the respective bank conjectures that there is no
impact of its own decisions on the competitor’s behavior.
While the assumption regarding simultaneous decisions on deposit and loan rates
seem quite reasonable, the timing of the hedging decision is not so obvious. In fact,
banking practice shows that depending on the current market situation hedging
decisions can be made before, at the same time of, or after decisions on interest rates,
but every time before uncertainty regarding non-performing loans is resolved. That
is, depending on the timing of the hedging decision there are three opportunities for
the final structure of the game: at first, when decisions on hedging and interest rates
are made simultaneously we are still in a one period setting where at the beginning of
the period all relevant decisions are made and at the end of the period uncertainty is
resolved and payouts are realized. However, while a game of this structure provides
a good benchmark for comparisons with other settings, in reality it seems to be of
minor interest.
7Of course, these assumptions are quite restrictive but provide a good starting point for a
detailed formal analysis of the subject. Dropping these assumptions is thus left for further research.
8See for example Froot et al. (1993) for a detailed analysis of the explanation for risk averse
behavior of firms in general and Froot and Stein (1998) and Pausch and Welzel (2002) for the
application of similar arguments in the context of the banking sector in particular.
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The second opportunity, where decisions on the optimal hedging volumes are
made after decisions on interest rates but before uncertainty is resolved, is a preferred
proceeding with large scale loans. There are situations in which a bank would like to
issue additional loans which substantially increase the banks’ overall loan portfolio.
However, with risk aversion the additional loan would alter the size of the loan
portfolio beyond the optimal level which forces the bank to adjust loan rates. In
order to avoid these adjustments, the bank might issue the loan at the present loan
rate and afterwards use hedging techniques to ensure the new situation being still
optimal. Note, for this reasoning to hold the additional loan has to be sufficiently
large. Small scale loans do influence the size of the overall loan portfolio only
marginally. However, when hedging decisions are made at an intermediate date of
the analyzed period of time, the final game is de facto a two stage one: at the first
stage (beginning of the period) decisions on interest rates are made, at the second
stage (intermediate date during the period) decisions on hedging are made. Again,
at the end of the period uncertainty is resolved and payouts are realized.
As already outlined by the introduction, in the third possible setting, the banks
firstly decide on optimal hedging levels and choose optimal deposit and loan rates
thereafter. Hence, the final game here is again a two stage one. The structure is the
same as in the previous case except that now decisions on interest rates are made
at an intermediate date.
Finally assume that in any of the three mentioned cases above a bank takes the
hedging volume of the respective competitor as given when deciding on its own
optimal hedging level.
3 The Role of Hedging in a Duopolistic Banking
Industry
The arguments of bankers which have been presented in the previous section suggest
very interesting interpretations of the potential role of hedging for banks. That is
to say, deciding on interest rates first – setting number two above – might force the
bank to adjust hedging levels in a further step in order to guarantee optimality of
the situation. Hence, in this case one might expect hedging to work as a opportunity
for adjusting the bank’s risk exposure in an optimal way. In contrast, when hedging
takes place before decisions on deposit and loan rates – setting number three above –
the bank seems to prepare for potential changes regarding the decisions on deposits
an loan rates. That is, from the arguments of bank practitioners one might expect
an influence of hedging on future interest rates in the latter case. Hence hedging
may serve as a strategic device in the competition of banks in this situation. In the
following we will analyze these conjectures in formal detail.
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3.1 Simultaneous Decisions on Hedging and Interest Rates
As explained earlier, the setting where decisions on hedging and interest rates are
made simultaneously is less relevant from a practical point of view than for a formal
analysis. That is we will use this case as a benchmark for the arguments to follow
in later sections and to become familiar with the basics of our model.
The optimization problems of the respective banks in the current situation are
given as follows:
max
rDi ,rLi ,Hi
E[U(Π˜i)] ; i, j = A,B (5)
where Π˜i is given by equation (4) above.
The corresponding first order necessary conditions may then be written as:
−Dˆi(rDi , rDj) + (r − rDi)
∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDi
= 0 (6)
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + (rLi − r)
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
)]
−
−E
[
U ′(Π˜i)θ˜
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + rLi + 1
) ∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
]
= 0 (7)
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
θ˜ − θ¯
)]
= 0 (8)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
Note, from the first order condition for the optimal deposit rate (6) one can observe
that credit risk does not matter in this regard. This, however, is obvious since on
the one hand the deposit business is not exposed to any source of risk directly. On
the other hand, from the assumptions regarding operating costs, there appears no
effect which influences decisions on optimal deposit rates caused by possible changes
of the optimal loan rates. Hence, one can restrict attention to decisions on loan rates
and hedging.
It is easy to see that with simultaneous decisions there appears no strategic impact
of hedging. That is, by definition a strategic move requires a sequential proceeding
of the considered game which is not the case in the present situation. (cf. Schelling,
1960, p. 119ff.) Hence one can immediately start analyzing optimal decisions of the
banks.
For this purpose rewrite equation (8) to arrive at
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)θ˜
]
= E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
]
θ¯ ; i = A,B.
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Using this expression to transform the first order necessary condition (7) yields
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
](
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + (rLi − r)
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
)
+
+E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
]
θ¯
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + rLi + 1
) ∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
= 0
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
which can be rewritten to arrive at
(1− θ¯)Lˆi(rLi , rLj) +
(
(1− θ¯)rLi − r − θ¯
) ∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
= 0. (9)
The interesting fact regarding equation (9) is that it is equivalent to the first order
necessary condition which would be derived in a situation without credit risk. That
is, if there were a certain share θ¯ instead of a random share θ˜ of non-performing loans
at the end of the period it is easily verified that the resulting first order necessary
condition for the optimal loan rate would exactly be equal to equation (9). Therefore
it is immediately clear that optimal deposit and loan rates are exactly the same as
in the case without credit risk. Remember, the first order necessary condition for
the optimal deposit rate is not at all affected by credit risk.
Therefore we can go on deriving the optimal hedging decisions: from E
[
U ′(Π˜i)θ˜
]
=
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
]
θ¯ it is easy to see that Cov(U ′(Π˜i), θ˜) = 0 must hold in equilibrium.9
Therefore, from the profit function (4) it is obvious that this is true if and only if
Hi = (1 + rLi)Lˆi(·). That is, in the optimum both banks fully hedge their exposure
to risk.
As a result, in case of simultaneous decisions on hedging and interest rates we
find both banks to fully hedge their exposure to risk and to choose deposit and
loan rates that are the same as in the case without credit risk. Hence, one can
observe a separation of the decisions regarding risk management and production
(i.e. interest rates). However, these results are well known from the literature
having perfect competition or monopoly.10 The reason for this result to appear is
that simultaneous decision making prevents strategic affects.
Moreover, one can show that in the equilibrium both banks set identical deposit
and loan rates, i.e. r∗DA = r
∗
DB
= rD and r
∗
LA
= r∗LB = rL where a ”*” denotes
optimal values.11 As a result it follows that in the equilibrium it must hold true that
9This follows immediately from the well known covariance formula E[U ′(Π˜i)θ˜] = E[U ′(Π˜i)]E[θ˜]+
Cov[U ′(Π˜i), θ˜] where E[θ˜] = θ¯.
10See for example Wahl and Broll (2000) for a presentation of a monopolistic situation.
11For a proof of this equilibrium strategy see the appendix.
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Dˆ∗A = Dˆ
∗
B =
1
2
D(rD) and Lˆ
∗
A = Lˆ
∗
B =
1
2
L(rL) and hence H
∗
A = H
∗
B = (rL + 1)
1
2
L(rL)
which is a further concretization of the full hedging result derived above.
To summarize results, we can now state our
Proposition 1 In a duopolistic banking industry with symmetric banks that simul-
taneously decide on hedging as well as deposit and loan rates both banks fully hedge
exposures to risk and choose the same deposit and loan rates as in a situation without
credit risk. Moreover, the equilibrium deposit and loan rates as well as the optimal
hedging levels are the same for both banks.
However, there are two further aspects regarding the symmetric equilibrium
stated in Proposition 1 which have to be mentioned. For this purpose consider
Bank A c.p. reducing deposit rate compared to equilibrium strategy. As a conse-
quence deposit supply of A drops down to zero and deposit supply of B increases by
1
2
D(rD). As a result B’s first order necessary condition for an optimal deposit rate
(6) is no longer met and, from the reasoning in the proof of rD being an equilibrium
strategy, it is obvious that B has to cut its deposit rate too. Therefore one can ob-
serve deposit rates to be strategic complements in the sense of (Bulow et al., 1985,
p. 501) – formally (cf. Bulow et al., 1985, p. 494):
∂2E
[
U(Π˜i)
]
∂rDi∂rDj
> 0 ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j. (10)
An analogous argument may be presented for the loan business: consider c.p. Bank
A increases the loan rate compared to the equilibrium strategy rL. As a result, bank
B’s demand for loans increases by 1
2
L(rL) which forces bank B to increase its loan
rate too. This is a direct result of the reasoning in the respective proof of rL to
be an equilibrium strategy. Hence loan rates are also strategic complements in the
sense of (Bulow et al., 1985, p. 501), formally (cf. Bulow et al., 1985, p. 494)
∂2E
[
U(Π˜i)
]
∂rLi∂rLj
> 0 ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j. (11)
With the observation that deposit and loan rates are strategic complements one
has to care about stability of the equilibrium. Note, when in the above example B
raises its deposit rate as a reaction to A’s increase of the deposit rate stability of
the equilibrium requires that B’s reduction of the deposit rate (as a reaction on A’s
reduction) has not to be stronger than A’s decrease of its deposit rate. Hence the
stability condition can be written formally (cf. Vives, 1999, p. 51):
det
 ∂
2E[U(Π˜i)]
(∂rDi )
2
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rDi∂rDj
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rDj ∂rDi
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rDj )
2
 > 0 ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j. (12)
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Analogously, in the above example B’s reaction to rise its loan rate to answer A’s
behavior mustn’t be as strong as A’s increase of loan rate. Otherwise the equilibrium
would not be stable, formally (cf. Vives, 1999, p. 51)
det
 ∂
2E[U(Π˜i)]
(∂rLi )
2
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂rLj
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLj ∂rLi
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rlj )
2
 > 0 ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j. (13)
Therefore, in the following we assume that stability conditions (12) and (13) will be
met in order to perform the desired analysis.
Another interesting aspect of our model is that although we consider a duopolistic
model of symmetric banks producing homogeneous goods – that is deposits and
loans – the well known Bertrand Paradox which is the usual consequence in similar
situations does not appear. That is, both banks realize strictly positive profits in
the equilibrium. This is obvious because our proof of (rD, rL) being an equilibrium
shows that r > rD > 0 and rL > r > 0 is valid, see appendix. The interpretation of
both inequalities is that in equilibrium prices of deposits and loans are larger than
marginal costs in the respective cases. A similar result is well known from the papers
of Yanelle (1985) and Yanelle (1988) which argue that in case of simultaneous price
competition in input and output markets – this is, indeed, what happens in the
banking industry – the Bertrand Paradox does not appear.
However, while in Yanelle (1985) and Yanelle (1988) the reason for this result is
that the volume of deposits taken restricts the volume of issued loans, our model
has to be analyzed closer to find out the reasons for the same result. Nevertheless,
the reasoning is quite similar to the one of Yanelle if one considers the balance sheet
constraint (3). Remember, in section 2 it was explained that the existence of the
interbank market separates deposit and loan business in the sense that a bank may
realize any desired volume of deposits and loans since any excess or shortage of funds
may be balanced with using the interbank market. The problem, however, is that
using the interbank market causes costs – that is the interbank rate r. Therefore, on
the one hand, issuing loans of larger volume than deposits taken requires the bank
to borrow additional funds in the interbank market which is more expensive than
using deposits for issuing loans – remember, in the equilibrium r > rD holds. On
the other hand, taking a larger volume of deposits than issued loans puts a bank
in a situation of lending the excess funds in the interbank market. This, however,
causes profits to decrease since in the equilibrium rL > r holds. Hence, our model
creates a kind of implicit relation between deposit and loan business in a sense that
deviating from D(rD) = L(rL) causes costs for the respective bank. As a result, the
budget constraint which has been explicitly assumed in Yanelle (1985) and Yanelle
(1988) appears implicitly in our model from the costs which arise when volumes of
deposits and loans differ.
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3.2 Decisions on Interest Rates before Hedging
As explained in section 2, when banks first set deposit and loan rates and decide on
hedging levels thereafter, the decision problem looks as follows:
stage 1 Both banks simultaneously decide on deposit and loan rates. In this way
the respective bank takes decisions of competitor as given
stage 2 Given decisions on interest rates in stage 1 both banks determine optimal
volumes of CDS.
In order to proceed the analysis in the present case we apply the concept of
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In this way we solve the game backwardly: we
first determine optimal hedging decisions taking decisions on interest rates of stage
1 as given. Thereafter we determine optimal deposit and loan rates where the result
of stage 1 is taken into account.
Hence on stage 2 both banks solve the following optimization problem:
max
Hi
E
[
U(Π˜i)
]
; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j (14)
where Π˜i is again given by equation (4) above.
The corresponding first order necessary conditions are then:
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
θ˜ − θ¯
)]
= 0 ; i = A,B. (15)
Now turning to stage 1 of the game it proves advantageous to replace Hi by
Hi(rDi , rLi , rDj , rLj) ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j to account for the opportunity of the
optimal hedging level to depend on deposit and loan rates of both banks – i.e. there
is the opportunity of the existence of strategic effects of interest rates on the hedging
behavior of competitors. Remember, in section two there have been presented some
arguments from practice which state that in the present case a certain decision
on interest rates at stage 1 might affect decisions on hedging at stage two. We
explicitly allow for such effects to appear with our notation. In this regard we
further assume any bank to take decisions on interest rates of the competitor as
given when making own decisions. This is reasonable because interest rates of both
banks are chosen simultaneously. That is, neither bank can observe and react to the
respective competitor’s decisions on deposit and loan rates.
As a result the following relations hold:
dHi(rDi , rLi , rDj , rLj)
drDi
=
∂Hi(rDi , rLi , rDj , rLj)
∂rDi
dHi(rDi , rLi , rDj , rLj)
drLi
=
∂Hi(rDi , rLi , rDj , rLj)
∂rDi
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
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Hence the optimization problem for stage 1 of the game may be written as
max
rDi ,rLi
E
[
U(Π˜i)
]
; i = A,B (16)
with corresponding first order necessary conditions
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
−Dˆi(rDi , rDj) + (rDi − r)
∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDi
)]
+
+E
[
U ′(Π˜i)(θ˜ − θ¯)
] dHi(rDi , rLi , rDj , rLj)
drDi
= 0 (17)
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + (rLi − r)
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
)]
−
−E
[
U ′(Π˜i)θ˜
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + (rLi + 1)
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
)]
+
+E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
θ˜ − θ¯
)] dHi(rDi , rLi , rDj , rLj)
drLi
= 0 (18)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
The interesting fact about equations (17) and (18) is that they only differ from
the respective first order necessary conditions (6) and (7) of simultaneous decisions
on hedging and interest rates in line two of (17) and line three of (18). That is, since
lines two and three in equations (17) and (18), respectively, represent the strategic
effect of interest rates on hedging it is immediately clear that differences in optimal
interest rates compared to the case of section 3.1 can appear if and only if these
strategic effects are not zero.
Therefore, in order to determine optimal deposit and loan rates as well as optimal
hedging decisions it is necessary to analyze the strategic effect in more detail. But
having a closer look at equations (17) and (18) and taking into account first order
conditions for the optimal hedging decision (15) it is easy to see that the second line
of (17) and the third line of (18) diminish.12 Note further, when strategic effects drop
12That is, for this reasoning to hold we apply the envelope theorem: from (15) we know that in
the equilibrium E[U ′(Π˜i)(θ˜− θ¯)] = 0 and hence the sign of Hi(rDi ,rDj ,rLi ,rLj )drDi and
Hi(rDi ,rDj ,rLi ,rLj )
drLi
are not longer relevant for the optimal decisions on interest rates.
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out first order necessary conditions for the optimal deposit and loan rates become
−Dˆi(rDi , rDj) + (r − rDi)
∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDi
= 0 and
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + (rLi − r)
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
)]
−
−E
[
U ′(Π˜i)θ˜
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + rLi + 1
) ∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
]
= 0
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
Comparing these equations with (6) and (7) in 3.1 shows that first order necessary
conditions are equivalent in both cases. Furthermore, by the same reasoning as in 3.1
it is obvious that from (15) Cov[U ′(Π˜i), θ˜] = 0 ; i = A,B follows immediately. That
is, in the equilibrium there is no interrelation between credit risk and a bank’s profit.
And, again, from the argument of section 3.1 it is well known that this appears if and
only if both banks fully hedge their exposure (1+rLi)Li(rLi , rLj)−Hi = 0 ; i = A,B.
Moreover, rewriting (15) to arrive at
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)θ˜
]
= E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
]
θ¯ ; i = A,B
and using this equation to rewrite (18) yields
(1− θ¯)
(
Lˆ(rLi , rLj) + rLi
dLˆ(rLi , rLj)
drLi
)
− (r + θ¯)dLˆ(rLi , rLj)
drLi
= 0.
This latter equation, however, is equivalent to (9) which is the first order necessary
condition for the optimal loan rate when the optimal hedging strategy is applied.
As a result the optimal loan rate is the same as the one of the riskless case which
is obvious since in the current situation it was argued that a full hedge is optimal.
Thus banks are no longer exposed to credit risk and choose loan rates accordingly.
Since, in addition, the first order necessary condition for the optimal deposit rate
does not change compared to the situation in section 3.1 it is obvious that optimal
deposit rates remain the same, too.
Moreover, due to perfect symmetry of the model in equilibrium both banks set
the same deposit rates as well as the same loan rates. That is, the proof of the
symmetric Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies in Proposition 1 which is presented
in the appendix may be applied in an analogous way for the situation in the current
section. Hence in equilibrium r∗DA = r
∗
DB
≡ rD and r∗LA = r∗LB ≡ rL holds. And, of
course, arguments regarding the uniqueness and the stability of the Nash equilibrium
applied in section 3.1 still apply in the present context. Therefore, it is clear, too,
that both banks realize strictly positive profits and the Bertrand Paradox does not
arise.
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At the end it is clear that the equilibrium on the hedging stage is symmetric,
too: since both banks choose the same deposit and loan rates the levels of deposits
taken and loans issued are the same, too. Because of the optimal hedging strategy
being to fully hedge exposure to risk both banks choose same amount of CDS in the
optimum: HA = HB = H = (1 + rL)L(rL). Hence, we can summarize results in
Proposition 2 When decisions on interest rates are made before decisions on hedg-
ing a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium will appear in which both banks fully hedge
exposures to risk and optimal deposit and loan rates are the same as in a situation
without credit risk. A strategic effect does not appear in this situation. Neither do
interest rates influence hedging nor the other way round.
The interpretation of this result is straightforward: even when decisions on hedg-
ing are made after decisions on deposit and loan rates the results do not change
compared to the situation in section 3.1. In particular we observe the appearance
of the strong separation property which is well known from the literature.(cf. Wahl
and Broll, 2000, for example) Therefore, both banks separate decisions on hedging
and interest rate. This separation, however is the reason why there does not appear
a strategic effect of interest rates although the game is a sequential one. Note, as
soon as decisions on interest rates are made there exists a unique dominant hedging
strategy which maximizes expected utility of a bank. This dominant strategy is to
fully hedge exposure to risk since doing so ensures that on the one hand profits are
maximized. On the other hand neither bank can credibly deviate from this strategy.
Note, since the banks compete in prices (i.e. loan rates in this situation) a bank
may only realize an advantage compared to the competitor when the own loan rate
is lower. However, when one bank deviates from the strategy to fully hedge its
exposure to risk this bank’s profit is no longer riskless. This, in turn, forces a risk
averse bank to choose loan rate such that a sufficient compensation for bearing risk
is achieved. Therefore, the deviating bank has to rise its loan rate and fails in the
competition of banks. Hence, the only optimal hedging strategy in the present situ-
ation is to fully hedge exposures to risk and thus there is no chance to use hedging
as a strategic device.
3.3 Hedging before Decisions on Interest Rates
Regarding the arguments of practitioners which have been mentioned in section 2
one may expect a situation where hedging takes place before decisions on deposit and
loan rates the most interesting one. The following analysis will provide arguments
on whether this impression is correct.
With the assumptions of section 2 the structure of the game is as follows:
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stage 1 Both banks may enter the market for CDS and simultaneously decide on
optimal levels of derivatives. The level of CDS of the respective competitor is
taken as given which is a direct consequence of the simultaneity of decisions.
stage 2 Both banks simultaneously set deposit and loan rates taking optimal levels
of CDS from stage 1 as given. Of course due to simultaneity of decisions on
interest rates neither bank expects the respective competitor to react on own
decisions.
Just like in the previous section we apply the concept of subgame perfect Nash-
equilibrium and backward induction in order to analyze the current situation. That
is, we first determine optimal interest rates in stage 2 given decisions on hedging and
afterwards determine optimal levels of CDS in stage 1 considering optimal interest
rates from stage two.
Therefore, given hedging decision, both banks solve the following optimization
problem on stage 2:
max
rDi ,rLi
E
[
U(Π˜i)
]
; i = A,B (19)
where Π˜i is given by equation (4) above.
The corresponding first order necessary conditions are:
−Dˆi(rDi , rDj) + (r − rDi)
∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDi
= 0 (20)
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + (rLi − r)
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
)]
−
−E
[
U ′(Π˜i)θ˜
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + (rLi + 1)
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
)]
= 0 (21)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
A comparison of (20) and (21) with the corresponding first order necessary conditions
(6) and (7) in the case of simultaneous decisions on interest rates and hedging shows
that, in general, first order necessary conditions for the optimal deposit and loan
rates are equivalent. Therefore, different results may appear if and only if the first
order necessary condition for the optimal hedging level differs from (8) in section
3.1.
In order to find out whether this is true we first have to conduct some modifi-
cations: note first that due to the sequential nature of the present game there may
occur strategic effects of the hedging decision on optimal deposit and loan rates.
Therefore we write in the following
rDi = rDi(Hi, Hj) and rLi = rLi(Hi, Hj) ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
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to account for this opportunity. Furthermore, since decisions on hedging volumes
are made simultaneously every bank conjectures that the respective competitor does
not change its decision regarding hedging as a reaction on own decisions. That is
dHi
dHj
= 0 ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j. Consequently, the following relations hold:
drDi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
=
∂rDi(Hi, Hj)
∂Hi
and
drLi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
=
∂rLi(Hi, Hj)
∂Hi
(22)
drDi(Hi, Hj)
dHj
=
∂rDi(Hi, Hj)
∂Hj
and
drLi(Hi, Hj)
dHj
=
∂rLi(Hi, Hj)
∂Hj
(23)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
Hence, one can state the banks’ optimization problems on stage 1 as
max
Hi
E
[
U(Π˜i)
]
; i = A,B (24)
with corresponding first order necessary conditions(
−Dˆi(rDi , rDj) + (r − rDi)
∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDi
)
drDi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
+
+E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
Lˆi(rLi , rLj) + (rLi − r)
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
)]
drLi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
−
−E
[
U ′(Π˜i)θ˜
(
Lˆ(rLi , rLj) + (rLi + 1)
∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLi
)]
drLi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
+
(r − rDi)
∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDj
drDj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
+
+E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rLi − r − θ˜
) ∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLj
]
drLj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
+
+E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
θ˜ − θ¯
)]
= 0
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
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By applying the envelope theorem13 yields
(r − rDi)
∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDj
drDj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
+
+E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rLi − r − θ˜
) ∂Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂rLj
]
drLj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
+
+E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
θ˜ − θ¯
)]
= 0 (25)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
After having derived first order necessary conditions we are interested in the
optimal levels of deposit and loan rates as well as the optimal hedging volume.
In this regard we proceed like in section 3.2. We first determine optimal hedging
decision and analyze optimal deposit and loan rates afterwards. Unfortunately, from
the condition for the optimal hedging level (25) it is not obvious what the optimal
hedging volume looks like. The reason is that (25) covers terms which include the
strategic effects
drDj (Hi,Hj)
dHi
and
drLj (Hi,Hj)
dHi
that do not diminish by simply applying
the envelope theorem. Therefore, before one can make statements about a bank’s
assets and liabilities management – that is deposit and loan rates as well as hedging
levels – the strategic effects have to be analyzed in more detail.
3.3.1 The Strategic Role of Hedging
As suggested earlier strategic effects may be seen from the signs of expressions:
drDi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
;
drDj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
;
drLi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
;
drLj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
That is, strategic effects exist if one can show that a bank’s decision regarding the
optimal volume of hedging affects deposit and loan rates of both banks. And in this
way hedging plays an important (strategic) role in the competition between banks.
Hence, we have to determine the signs of the expressions above.
Regarding the deposit business at first we can state and prove
13Note, the first term in the first line of this latter equation is equivalent to the first order
necessary conditions (20) for the optimal deposit rate which have to be zero in the optimum.
Analogously, the first terms in lines two and three are equivalent to the first order necessary
conditions (21) for the optimal loan rates which have to be zero in the optimum, too.
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Proposition 3 In the deposit business there is no strategic effect of hedging, i.e.
drDi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
= 0 (26)
drDj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
= 0 (27)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The interpretation of this result is obvious, since credit risk does not influence
the deposit business. Note, this has been already explained in detail earlier, and
because there does not appear an interrelation between deposit and loan business
via operating costs hedging is not able to affect optimal decisions on deposit rates.
Turning now to the loan business we can state and prove
Proposition 4 In the loan business there appears a strategic effect of hedging. In
particular, as long as the banks’ profit function exhibits constant or decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense hedging positively affects loan rates of
both banks and hence dilutes the intensity of competition, i.e.
drLi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
> 0 (28)
drLj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
> 0 (29)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
Proof: See the Appendix.
There are some interesting observations which can be derived from the proof of
proposition 4: in the proof it was clarified that the crucial factor for the strategic
effect to appear is the sign of the term ∂
2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂Hi
. This term characterizes the effect of
hedging on the expected marginal utility of a bank’s profit with respect to the loan
rate. If this effect is positive – which is true in the present setting – a higher hedging
volume increases expected marginal utility in the loan business. If one further
remembers that the optimal loan rate can be determined using the expected marginal
utility 14 it is immediately clear that due to the effect of hedging on the expected
14Note, the first order necessary conditions (21) state that in equilibrium the expected marginal
utility of a bank with respect to the loan rate has to be zero.
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marginal utility the optimal loan rate changes. In other words, choosing the hedging
volume before interest rates sends a signal to a bank’s competitor which supplies
him with information on the bank’s future loan rate. As a rational competitor takes
this information into account when choosing the optimal loan rate it is obvious that
hedging works as a strategic move in the competition among banks in the current
setting. In fact, this result is in line with the theoretical literature on the strategic
role of hedging.(Allaz and Vila, 1993, cf.)
A closer look at the expression for ∂
2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂Hi
allows an additional very important
interpretation. That is, the appearance of the strategic effect crucially depends on
our assumption of risk aversion (U ′′(·) < 0). In case of risk neutrality, i.e. U ′′(·) = 0,
it turns out that ∂
2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂Hi
= 0 and the strategic effect of hedging disappears. This
leads to a very important conclusion: as long as a bank knows that the respective
competitor is risk averse and, in turn, the competitor knows that the considered
bank is risk averse, too, there appears a strategic effect of hedging. In this context
it is not necessary that a bank can observe the hedging activities of the competitor.
The common information that both banks are risk averse will suffice for hedging
to act as a strategic move in the competition among banks. It is the risk aversion
which makes hedging beneficial in our model. Hence, risk aversion provides the
foundation for the strategic effect. Thus, our result confirms the results of Hughes
and Kao (1997) who argue that it is not the observability of the hedging activity
per se which is necessary for a strategic effect of hedging to appear. Rather it is
the hedging motive, i.e. the fact that hedging is beneficial for the firms, which is
important in the competition among firms.
3.3.2 Assets and Liabilities Management
Knowing the strategic effects of hedging allows to analyze optimal decisions on
hedging as well as optimal decisions on deposit and loan rates. We can thus state
our
Proposition 5 In case of constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion in the sense
of Arrow and Pratt the unique equilibrium hedging volume H of both banks is larger
than the bank’s exposures to credit risk, i.e. there appears an over hedge in the
equilibrium, i.e. H > (1 + rL)L(rL). Consequently, the unique optimal loan rate
rL of both banks increases compared to the situations in 3.1 and 3.2. The unique
optimal deposit rate rD, however, does not change.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The interpretation of this result is straightforward. Firstly consider optimal de-
cisions on interest rates to note that in the present context hedging does not com-
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pletely eliminate risk. Due to the over hedge the banks are still exposed to risk and
hence the loan rate increasing effect of risk aversion still works. This is a direct
consequence of the strategic effect of hedging in this context.
Furthermore, due to the strategic effect a bank can force its respective competitor
to increase the loan rate. The reason is that loan rates are strategic complements in
the sense of Bulow et al. (1985). Hence, the over hedge of a bank leaves this bank
exposed to risk which, in turn, requires to increase the loan rate compared to a
situation with a full hedge. However, due to loan rates being strategic complements
the competing bank has to increase the loan rate too. Otherwise there were no
optimal situation.15 Thus, with hedging a bank can gain an advantage at the expense
of the competitor. This strategic effect of hedging works towards an increase of the
hedging volume.
On the other hand, any hedging volume that differs from a full hedge leaves
the bank exposed to risk which causes its expected utility to decrease due to risk
aversion. The validity of this argument is evident when one has a closer look at the
first order necessary condition for the optimal hedging levels in sections 3.1 and 3.2
(8) and (15), respectively, which are16
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
θ˜ − θ¯
)]
= 0 ; i = A,B.
Hence, an under hedge can not be optimal. On top of this we are also able to exclude
the possibility of a hedging volume that runs to infinity, because for any over-hedge
we perceive a trade off between the strategic effect that promotes the over-hedge
and the decreasing expected utility. Overall this yields a finite over-hedge. More
formally, by using the results derived so far the first order necessary conditions for
the optimal hedging levels in the current situation (25) can be rewritten to yield
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rL − r − θ˜
)
1
2
dL(rL)
drL
]
drLj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
+ E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
θ˜ − θ¯
)]
= 0.
Note, the second term on the left hand side of this equation is equivalent to the
first order necessary conditions for the optimal hedging levels in sections 3.1 and 3.2
(8) and (15) and, thus, represents the risk effect. The first term on the left hand
side of the above equation represents the strategic effect of hedging on rLj .
17 In this
regard we already know that the strategic effect is positive and hence leads to an
increase of the hedging level in any situation. The risk effect of hedging, however,
15Note, in section 3.1 this argument has been presented in more detail.
16Note, in the situations analyzed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 there did not appear a strategic effect
of hedging. Hence the optimal hedging levels have been the full hedge in both situations which is
obvious since this strategy minimizes the disutility of bearing risk on both situations. The resulting
effect – call it risk effect of hedging – thus works towards a full hedge of the bank’s exposure.
17This was derived in the proof of proposition 5 in the appendix.
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always acts towards a full hedge. That is, as long as the bank’s hedging volume is
less than the exposure to risk (under hedge) both effects work in the same direction
and make the bank increase the hedging volume. Therefore, a under hedge is not
optimal in the current setting. When a bank, however, chooses a hedging volume
beyond the level of the full hedge there appears a trade-off between both effects:
the strategic effect still works towards increasing the hedging level, while the risk
effect demands to decrease the hedging volume. As a result, there must be a certain
hedging level where both effects balance out. This optimal hedging level then is
necessarily achieved with an over hedge.
4 Conclusion
Due to the growing importance and international liquidity of credit derivatives and
because of the increasing interdependencies of competitors in the banking industry
our paper investigated possible strategic effects of management decisions concerning
interest rates for loans and deposits as well as the hedging volume on the behavior
of competitors. We considered three scenarios of the decision process that can be
observed in banking practice. From intuition it seems clear that with simultaneous
decisions strategic effects can not occur. Our model is able to confirm this impression
formally. In case of a sequential process where the decision on interest rates precedes
the hedging decision matters are not that clear. Nonetheless, our model rejects both
a strategic effect of interest rates and of hedging. In contrast, when the hedging
decision is made at first there is a strategic effect of hedging on the loan rates of the
competitor. More precisely, when one bank increases its hedging this will not only
cause its own loan rate to rise but also the competitors loan rate to keep equilibrium
and optimality. Moreover, and unlike the other scenarios, this case leads to an over-
hedge of exposure.
We are confident that our paper will not only help to promote the scientific
discussion in this area but also sensitize management in banking industry for this
issue. The usefulness our paper for practice can be further improved by extending
the set of credit derivatives considered within our theoretical framework to cover
credit default swaps with basis risk and credit default digitals. Future research
should also try to relax our assumption of a risk neutral market.
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Appendix
Proof of the Symmetric Equilibrium in Proposition 1
Consider the first order necessary conditions (6) and (7) and note that an equilibrium
strategy [(r∗DA , r
∗
DB
), (r∗LA , r
∗
LB
)] simultaneously solves systems (6) and (7). In order
to prove the existence of a Nash-Equilibrium in pure strategies where both banks set
identical deposit and loan rates we show that a one-sided deviation from strategies
r∗DA = r
∗
DB
≡ rD and r∗LA = r∗LB ≡ rL puts the deviating bank worse off. Hence there
is no incentive to choose another strategy than the one claimed to be an equilibrium.
In this way consider first the deposit business, i.e. equation (6): with strategy
rD equations (6) can be rewritten as follows:
− 1
2
D(rD) + (r − rD) 12
dD(rD)
drD
= 0. (30)
It is easy to see that for this equation to hold r > rD > 0 must be true since
D(rD) > 0 and
dD(rD)
drD
> 0. Therefore taking deposits adds strictly positive amount
to banks’ profits and a situation like the Bertrand Paradox – which is the usual result
in symmetric models of oligopolies with price competition – does not appear.18
We will now argue that it is not beneficial to one of the banks to deviate from
the equilibrium strategy rD:
Let for example c.p. rDA < rD. Then - from definition of deposit supply function
- Bank A’s deposit supply drops to zero and as a result profits from taking deposits
drop out. Therefore the profit of bank A decreases due to the one-sided reduction
of the deposit rate.
Let now c.p. rDA > rD. Then - due to the definition of deposit supply and
dD(rDi )
drDi
> 0 it must be true that
DˆA(rDA , rD) = D(rDA) > D(rD) >
1
2
D(rD) = DˆA(rD, rD).
Furthermore, due to
d2D(rDi )
(drDi )
2 < 0 following relation holds
dD(rDA)
drDA
<
dD(rD)
drD
.
18For the appearance of the Bertrand Paradox our model would require rD = r. The interpre-
tation of this condition is straightforward: r represents the revenue and rD the cost per unit of
deposits taken since a bank has to pay rD per unit to depositors and receives r per unit of deposit
from lending in the interbank market. Hence the relation for the Bertrand Paradox stated above
says that in this case price equals marginal costs.
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Hence, in order for (6) to be satisfied rDA < rD must hold which contradicts as-
sumption rDA > rD, and rDA > rD cannot be an equilibrium.
Since this reasoning analogously holds for bank B an one-sided deviation from
rD is obviously not reasonable for any of the two banks. Consequently rD must be
an equilibrium in the deposit market.
Consider now the banks’ loan business, i.e. equations (7): with strategy rL
equations (7) can be rewritten:
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ rL
)
− (r + θ˜)
)]
= 0. (31)
From r > 0, θ˜ ∈ [0, 1], and U ′(·) > 0 it is immediately clear, that equation (31)
holds if and only if L(rL)dL(rL)
drL
+ rL > 0 – otherwise the expected marginal utility would
be strictly negative.
Using the well known covariance formula E(XY ) = E(X)E(Y ) + Cov(X,Y ) and
rearranging terms yields
E[U ′(Π˜i)]
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ rL − r
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
−
−
(
E(U ′(Π˜i))E(θ˜) + Cov(U ′(Π˜i), θ˜)
)(L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ rL + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
= 0.
Since U ′(·) > 0 and Cov(U ′(Π˜i), θ˜) > 0, where the sign of the covariance immediately
follows from (4) from which one can observe Π˜i to shrink and, due to U
′′(Π˜i) < 0,
U ′(Π˜i) to increase when θ˜ rises, the latter equation holds if and only if terms a and
b have the same sign. Due to L(rL)dL(rL)
drL
+ rL > 0 – see arguments above – this is true if
an only if
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ rL > r.
After rearranging terms this relation may be rewritten as
rL − r > −L(rL)dL(rL)
drL
.
Since L(rL)dL(rL)
drL
< 0 it follows that
rL > r > 0
in equilibrium.
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As a result, in equilibrium the loan business adds a strictly positive amount to
the banks’ profits and, again, the Bertrand Paradox does not appear.19
Just like in the deposit business we will now argue that it ist not beneficial for
at least one of the banks to deviate from the strategy rL.
Let for example c.p. rLA > rL: then from definition of loan demand Bank A’s
level of loans drops to zero. However, since loans add a positive amount to bank A’s
profits this behavior reduces profits and is thus not beneficial.
Consider now c.p. rLA < rL: in this case bank A’s loan demand increases and
the following relation holds:
LˆA(rLA , rL) = L(rLA) > L(rL) >
1
2
L(rL) = LˆA(rL, rL)
Furthermore, due to
d2L(rLi )
(drLi )
2 < 0 it follows that
dL(rLA )
drLA
> dL(rL)
drL
and hence
L(rLA)
dL(rLA )
drLA
<
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
.
Thus, in order to (7) be satisfied, rLA > rL must hold which contradicts rLA < rL.
As a consequence rLA < rL cannot be an equilibrium.
The same reasoning holds for bank B deviating form rL in an analogous way.
Therefore, rL must be an equilibrium.
Consider now equation (8) which determines optimal hedging levels of both banks.
In section 3.1.1 it was argued that for any bank this condition implies to fully hedge
the exposure to credit risk. With this strategy it was shown in section 3.1.1 that
equation (7) reduces to equation (9). However, this latter equation is just a special
case of (7). Therefore, the arguments regarding equilibrium strategies in the loan
business presented earlier even hold for (9). Hence both banks set the same loan
rates (rL)in the equilibrium.
Moreover, since this implies that both banks issue the same volume of loans in
the equilibrium ( 1
2
L(rL)) it is obvious that both banks realize the same equilibrium
hedging levels. That is, in the equilibrium it must be true that H∗A = H
∗
B ≡ H =
(1 + rL) 12L(rL). ¤
19If the Bertrand Paradox would appear, it would be true that rL = r which would have to be
interpreted as ”price equals marginal costs” in the equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 3
In order to determine the sign of
drDi (Hi,Hj)
dHi
and
drDj (Hi,Hj)
dHi
we apply the implicit
function theorem and the Cramer rule to arrive at
drDi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
=
det
 −∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rDi∂Hi ∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rDi∂rDj
−∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rDj ∂Hi
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
(∂rDj )
2

det
 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)](∂rDi )2 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rDi∂rDj
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rDi∂rDj
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
(∂rDj )
2

=
detJDi
detJD
(32)
drDj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
=
det
 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)](∂rDi )2 −∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rDi∂Hi
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rDj ∂rDi
−∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rDj ∂Hi

det
 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)](∂rDi )2 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rDi∂rDj
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rDi∂rDj
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
(∂rDj )
2

=
detJDj
detJD
(33)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
Since our aim is to determine the sign of expressions (32) and (33) we have to find
out the signs of the single components of the respective expressions. Furthermore,
as we consider a banks’ behavior in the equilibrium of the game we calculate all
expressions for the equilibrium values of deposit and loan rates. In this regard
the arguments from the proof of the symmetric equilibrium above can be applied
analogously. Hence we can use the unique equilibrium strategy rD in our subsequent
reasoning.
From the arguments of section 3.1 concerning deposit rates beeing strategic com-
plements one can observe (see equation (10)):
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rDi∂rDj
> 0 ; i, j = A,B i 6= j
Furthermore from differentiating (20) with respect to rDi one arrives at
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
(∂rDi)
2
= −2∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDi
+ (r − rDi)
∂2Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
(∂rDi)
2
< 0 ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
where the inequality follows from the arguments of the proof of rD to be the equi-
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librium strategy and hence in the equilibrium it must be true that
r − rDi = r − rD > 0,
∂Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂rDi
=
dD(rD)
drD
> 0,
∂2Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
(∂rDi)
2
=
d2D(rD)
(drD)2
< 0
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
Moreover, differentiating (20) with respect to Hi and Hj yields
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rDi∂Hi
= 0
and
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rDi∂Hi
= 0
respectively.
At least, again from section 3.1, the equilibrium is stable if equation (12) holds,
that is
detJD > 0.
As a result detJDi = detJDj = 0 and detJD > 0 and hence in the equilibrium it
must be true that
drDi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
= 0 (34)
drDj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
= 0 (35)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
¤
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Proof of Proposition 4
Analogous to the former case we determine the sign of
drLi (Hi,Hj)
dHi
and
drLj (Hi,Hj)
dHi
by
applying the implicit function theorem and the Cramer rule:
drLi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
=
det
 −∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rLi∂Hi ∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rLi∂rLj
−∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rLj ∂Hi
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
(∂rLj )
2

det
 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)](∂rLi )2 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rLi∂rLj
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rLi∂rLj
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
(∂rLj )
2

=
detJLi
detJL
(36)
drLj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
=
det
 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)](∂rLi)2 −∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rLi∂Hi
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rLj ∂rLi
−∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rLj ∂Hi

det
 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)](∂rLi )2 ∂2E[U(Π˜i)]∂rLi∂rLj
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
∂rLi∂rLj
∂2E[U(Π˜j)]
(∂rLj )
2

=
detJLj
detJL
(37)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
In general, the proceeding of the proof is the same like the one in the proof of
proposition 3. That is, we analyze the effect of hedging on the equilibrium loan rate
rL which is the same for both banks.
20
From the arguments of section 3.1 loan rates are known to be strategic comple-
ments, i.e.
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂rLj
> 0 ; i, j = A,B ; i 6= j.
Furthermore it must be true that in equilibrium
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
(∂rLi)
2
= 1
2
E
[
U ′′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)L(rL) +
(
(1− θ˜)rL − r − θ˜
) dL(rL)
drL
)2]
+
+2E
[
U ′(Π˜i)(1− θ˜)
] dL(rL)
drL
+
+E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rL − r − θ˜
)] d2L(rL)
(drL)2
< 0
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
20Again it is easily verified that the arguments of the proof of the symmetric equilibrium of
proposition 1 are still valid in the current situation. Hence both banks choose the same loan rates
in the equilibrium.
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where the inequality follows from risk aversion (U ′′(·) > 0) and from the fact that
quadratic terms are non-negative ((·)2 ≥ 0). Moreover, from the proof of proposition
5 we know E
[
U ′(Π˜i)(1− θ˜)
]
> 0 and E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rL − r − θ˜
)]
> 0 and by
assumption in the equilibrium dL(rL)
drL
, d
2L(rL)
(drL)2
< 0 holds.
Now, differentiating (21) with respect to Hi and Hj yields
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂Hi
= E
[
U ′′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+
(
(1− θ˜)rL − r − θ˜
))(
θ˜ − θ¯
)]
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂Hj
= 0
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
where equation (21) was divided by dL(rL)
drL
before differentiating.
In order to determine the sign of the first equation rearrange terms to arrive at
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂Hi
= E
[
U ′′(Π˜i)
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL − r)− θ˜
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL + 1)
))(
θ˜ − θ¯
)]
.
(38)
Consider now (θ˜ − θ¯): adding L(rL)dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL − r)− L(rL)dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL − r) and multiplying
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+(rL+1)
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+(rL+1)
yields
θ˜ − θ¯ = 1
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL + 1)
(c¯− c˜)
where
c¯ =
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL − r)− θ¯
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL + 1)
)
and
c˜ =
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL − r)− θ˜
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL + 1)
)
Hence (38) can be rewritten as follows
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂Hi
=
1
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL + 1)
(
E[U ′′(Π˜i)c˜]c¯− E[U ′′(Π˜i)c˜2]
)
.
In this latter equation it is obvious that L(rL)dL(rL)
drL
+(rL+1) > 0 – see the arguments in the
proof of the symmetric equilibrium from proposition 1 above. Furthermore,E[U ′′(Π˜i)c˜2] <
0 since U ′′(·) < 0 and c˜2 > 0.
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Therefore, in order to determine the sign of (38) the sign of E[U ′′(Π˜i)c˜]c¯ has to be
figured out: applying the covariance formula to the first order necessary conditions
(21) yields
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL − r)− θ¯
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL + 1)
)
=
=
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL + 1)
)
Cov(U ′(Π˜i), θ˜)
E[U ′(Π˜i)]
.
Since the first line of this latter equation is equivalent to c¯, L(rL)dL(rL)
drL
+(rL+1) > 0 and
E[U ′(·)] > 0 by assumption the sign of c¯ only depends on the sign of Cov(U ′(·), θ˜).
In this regard inspection of the profit function (4) shows
Cov(U ′(Π˜i), θ˜)
>
=
<
0 ⇔ (rL + 1)L(rL)−Hi
>
=
<
0
and as a result
c¯
>
=
<
0 ⇔ (rL + 1)L(rL)−Hi
>
=
<
0.
Unfortunately without additional assumption regarding the utility function no
further results can be derived. However, it is acknowledged that increasing absolute
risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense (IARA) is not very reasonable for real life
situations. Therefore, in the following we restrict attention to constant (CARA)
and decreasing (DARA) absolute risk aversion in the sense of Arrow and Pratt.
Consider at first CARA, i.e. −U ′′(Π˜i)
U ′(Π˜i)
= const. ∀ Π˜i. Assuming CARA one can
write
E
[
U ′′(Π˜i)c˜
]
=
U ′′(Π˜i)
U ′(Π˜i)
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)c˜
]
= 0
where the second equality follows from the fact that for the first order necessary
conditions (21) in the equilibrium it must be true that E[U ′(·)c˜] = 0.
Hence if utility function exhibits CARA it must be unambiguously true that
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂Hi
> 0.
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In case of decreasing absolute risk aversion in the sense of Arrow-Pratt (DARA)
the following relation must hold (cf. Ross, 1981, p. 623)
d
dΠ˜i
(
−U
′′(Π˜i)
U ′(Π˜i)
)
= −U
′′′(Π˜i)
U ′(Π˜i)
(
U ′′′(Π˜i)
U ′′(Π˜i)
− U
′′(Π˜i)
U ′(Π˜i)
)
< 0
⇔ U ′′′(Π˜i) > (U
′′(Π˜i))2
U ′(Π˜i)
The following arguments are adopted from a proof of (Wong, 1997, p. 208f.):
First define a function N(θ˜) = U
′′(Π˜i)
U ′(Π˜i)
and then differentiate N(θ˜) with respect to
θ˜ to determine behavior of N(θ˜) when θ˜ changes:
N ′(θ˜) = −(rL + 1)L(rL)−Hi
U ′(Π˜i)
[
U ′′′(Π˜i)− (U
′′(Π˜i))2
U ′(Π˜i)
]
Due to DARA the following relationships hold:
N ′(θ˜)
<
=
>
0 ⇔ (rL + 1)L(rL)−Hi
>
=
<
0
Now define θˆ to be the realization of θ˜ for which the following relation holds
c(θˆ) =
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL − r)− θˆ
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ (rL + 1)
)
= 0.
Thus for any θ˜ > θˆ it follows that c(θ˜) < c(θˆ) and c(θ˜) < 0. Hence it must be true
that
N(θ˜)c(θ˜)
>
=
<
N(θˆ)c(θ˜) ⇔ (rL + 1)L(rL)−Hi
>
=
<
0.
Similarly for any θ˜ < θˆ it follows that c(θ˜) > c(θˆ) and c(θ˜) > 0. As a result the
following relations hold:
N(θ˜)c(θ˜)
>
=
<
N(θˆ)c(θ˜) ⇔ (rL + 1)L(rL)−Hi
>
=
<
0.
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From these arguments one can observe equivalent relations to hold regardless whether
θ˜ > θˆ or θ˜ < θˆ Therefore multiplying both sides of the above relations by U ′(Π˜i) > 0
and taking expectations with respect to θ˜ yields
E
[
U ′′(Π˜i)c˜
] >
=
<
N(θˆ)E
[
U ′(Π˜i)c˜
]
= 0 ⇔ (rL + 1)L(rL)−Hi
>
=
<
0
where the equality follows from the first order necessary conditions (21) which state
that E[U ′(Π˜)c˜] = 0.
As a result it is obvious that c¯ and E[U ′(Π˜i)] have the same sign in any case and
hence
c¯E
[
U ′(Π˜i)c˜
]
≥ 0.
Thus as long as utility function exhibits CARA or DARA it must be true that
∂2E[U(Π˜i)]
∂rLi∂Hi
> 0.
As a consequence one derives that detJLi > 0 and detJLj > 0. Furthermore from
arguments regarding stability of the equilibrium it is already known that detJL > 0
must hold true. As a result the strategic effect of hedging on the optimal loan rate
may be represented as
drLi(Hi, Hj)
dHi
> 0 (39)
drLj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
> 0 (40)
i, j = A,B ; i 6= j
¤
Proof of Proposition 5
To proceed the proof we first determine optimal hedging levels and second derive
optimal deposit and loan rates.
For determining optimal hedging levels consider the corresponding first order
necessary conditions (25). The third line of (25) can be transformed applying the
covariance formula and using E(θ˜) = θ¯ to yield
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
θ˜ − θ¯
)]
= Cov[U ′(Π˜i), θ˜].
Hedging in Banks Duopoly 34
The sign of the first line of (25) only depends on the sign of
drDj (Hi,Hj)
dHi
. The
reason is that due to the assumptions on the deposit supply function
∂Dˆi(rDi ,rDj )
∂rDj
< 0
and from the first order necessary conditions (20) it follows that
r − rDi =
Dˆi(rDi , rDj)
∂Dˆi(rDi ,rDj )
∂rDi
≥ 0.
Furthermore the sign of the second line of (25) only depends on the sign of
drLj (Hi,Hj)
dHi
since due to assumptions on the loan demand function
∂Lˆi(rLi ,rLj )
∂rLj
> 0
and from the first order necessary conditions (21) it follows that
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rLi − r − θ˜
)]
= −E[U
′(Π˜i)(1− θ˜)]Lˆi(rLi , rLj)
∂Lˆi(rLi ,rLj )
∂rLi
≥ 0.
In this regard one has to note that it must be true that E[U ′(Π˜i)(1− θ˜)] ≥ 0 since
both random variables – while negatively correlated – are non-negative (marginal
utility is strictly positive). Hence the expected value of the product of both random
variables must be non-negative, too.
Moreover, in the proofs of propositions 3 and 4 it was shown that in the equilib-
rium the following relations hold:
drDj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
= 0
and
drLj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
> 0.
Therefore from the first order necessary conditions (25) it follows that in equilibrium
Cov
(
U ′(Π˜i), θ˜
)
= −E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rL − r − θ˜
)
1
2
dL(rL)
drL
]
drLj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
< 0.
(41)
21 Due to risk aversion and examination of profit function (4) reveals that this is the
case if and only if
(rL + 1)L(rL)−Hi < 0. (42)
That is it is optimal for both banks to over hedge their risky positions. Furthermore,
since both banks choose the same deposit and loan rates in the equilibrium the
21In this latter equation we have used the fact, that just like in the situations of section 3.1 and
3.2 both banks set the same deposit and loan rates in the equilibrium. That is, the arguments
presented in the proof of the symmetric equilibrium of proposition 1 can be applied in the current
situation as well.
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optimal hedging levels have to be the same as well for both banks, i.e. H∗A = H
∗
B ≡
H.
Using this result one can now determine optimal deposit and loan rates:
Since hedging as well as risk does not affect the deposit side of the banks’ busi-
nesses the optimal deposit rate remains the same compared to the cases of sections
3.1 and 3.2 and hence is the same like in a situation without credit risk.
However loan rates do change as follows: from the first order necessary conditions
(41) in the equilibrium the following relation must hold:
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)θ˜
]
= E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
]
θ¯−E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rL − r − θ˜
)
1
2
dL(rL)
drL
]
drDj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
.
Applying this equation to rewrite the first order necessary conditions for the optimal
loan rate (21) yields
(1− θ¯)
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ rL
)
− (r + θ¯) =
= −
(
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
+ rL + 1
)
E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rL − r − θ˜
)
1
2
L(rL)
dL(rL)
drL
]
drDj(Hi, Hj)
dHi
> 0
where the inequality follows due to L(rL)dL(rL)
drL
+ rL+1 > 0.
22 Furthermore, it was shown
earlier in this section that E
[
U ′(Π˜i)
(
(1− θ˜)rL − r − θ˜
)
1
2
L(rL)
]
drDj (Hi,Hj)
dHi
> 0 and
by assumption dL(rL)
rL
< 0.
As a result the optimal loan rate is still higher than the one of the riskless case
– i.e. rL > r
c
L. ¤
22See the proof of the symmetric equilibrium in proposition 1 above.
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